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Abstract. Email has become an integral part of everyday life. Without
a second thought we receive bills, bank statements, and sales promotions
all to our inbox. Each email has hidden features that can be extracted. In
this paper, we present a new mechanism to characterize an email with-
out using content or context called Email Shape Analysis. We explore the
applications of the email shape by carrying out a case study; botnet de-
tection and two possible applications: spam filtering, and social-context
based finger printing. Our in-depth analysis of botnet detection leads
to very high accuracy of tracing templates and spam campaigns. How-
ever, when it comes to spam filtering we do not propose new method but
rather a complementing method to the already high accuracy Bayesian
spam filter. We also look at its ability to classify individual senders in
personal email inbox’s.
1 Introduction
The behavior of email is something that is often overlooked. Email has been with
us for so long that we begin to take it for granted. However, email may yet provide
new techniques for classification systems. In this paper, we introduce the concept
of email shape analysis and a few of its applications. Email shape analysis is a
simple yet powerful method of classifying emails without the use of conventional
email analysis techniques which rely on header information, hyperlink analysis,
and natural language processing. It is a method of breaking down emails into
a parameterized form for use with modeling techniques. In parameterized form
the email is seen as a skeleton of its text and HTML body. The skeleton is used
to draw a contouring shape, which is used for email shape analysis.
One of the largest threats facing the internet privacy and security of email
users is spam email. According to the NY Times in March 2009, 94% of all email
is spam. Email can contain malicious code and lewd content, both of which
need to be avoided by 100%. The use of a behavior based detection method will
increase the accuracy and compliment current analysis methods in malicious and
spam activity.
In this paper, we discuss a case study involving spam botnet detection. We
also discuss the possible applications spam and ham filtering and social finger
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printing of senders. Recent papers presenting on this topic of botnet detection use
network traffic behavior [1][2] and also domain name service blackhole listings [3],
whereby botnets are discovered when they query the blackhole listings in DNS
servers. By introducing shape analysis, one can further confirm the authenticity
of the bot classifier.
The first application goes back to the proverbial spam question [4][5][6][7].
We look at the ability of shape analysis to correctly identify spam. In this study
we are not trying to compete against the Bayesian filter, but rather compliment
its decision process by offering non-content and non-context aware classification.
The nature of the shape analysis classifier allows for both language independent
and size independent email shape generation. This is believed to be very useful
as the world becomes further integrated and spam comes in multiple languages
to everyone.
In the second application, we look at the potential of email shape analysis to
identify social context-based finger prints. We propose the ability to distinguish
individual or group senders based on the social context. The data set for this
study is one subject’s personal email inbox.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The concept of the proposed
Email Shape is described in section 2. Section 3 presents the case study email
spam botnet detection. Section 4 discusses future work and their preliminary re-
sults on email spam filtering and social context-based finger print identification.
Section 5 reviews some limitations of our study. Section 6 concludes the paper
with a summary and an outlook on future work.
2 Email Shape
We define “shape” of an email as a shape that a human would perceive (e.g.,
shape of a bottle). Without reading the content, shape of an email can be visu-
alized as its contour envelope.
Email shape (e-shape) can be obtained from its “skeleton” that is simply a
set of character counts for each line in the text and HTML code of email content.
Let L denote the total number of lines in the email text and HTML code, and
hk denote the character count (this includes all characters and whitespace) in
line k. A skeleton (H) of an email thus can be defined as follows.
H = {h1, h2, h3, ..., hL} . (1)
Skeleton H can be treated as a random variable. Thereby the shape of an
email can be derived from its skeleton by applying a Gaussian kernel density
function (also known as Parzen window method) [8], which is a non-parametric
approach for estimating probability density function (pdf) of a random variable
and given by Eq. 2.
f(x) =
1
Lw
L∑
k=1
K(
x− hk
w
), (2)
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where K(u) is the kernel function and w is the bandwidth or smoothing param-
eter. To select the optimal bandwidth, we use the AMISE optimal bandwidth
selection based on Sheather Jones Solve-the-equation plug-in method [9]. Our
kernel function is a widely used zero mean and unit variance given by Eq. 3
K(u) =
1√
2pi
e−u
2/2. (3)
With this approach, an algorithm for finding e-shape can be constructed
as shown in Alg. 1. Figure 1 illustrates the process of extracting e-shape. An
example of four different e-shapes is illustrated in Fig. 2.
In summary, email shape is found by computing the number of character per
line in an email. Almost every email has a text and HTML body. The lines are
put into a file from which the Gaussian kernel density estimator smooths the
rigid line graph into a normalized, smoothed graph. This graph is calculated
for every email. We then performed a comparative function, called Hellinger
distance, to find how closely each email shape is related.
Algorithm 1. Email Shape
S = Email Shape(C)
Input: Email Text and HTML code (C)
Output: E-Shape (S)
1. FOR i = 1 to L /*L is the total number of lines in email HTML code */
2. hi = character count of line i;
3. END FOR
4. H = {h1, h2, h3, ..., hL}; /* skeleton is extracted */
5. S =applying Gaussian kernel density function onH; /* e-shape is obtained */
6. Return S
3 Applications of E-Shape
Our understanding of what shape analysis has to offer to the community is
only at the beginning. We present, in the paper, a case study and two future
work applications that outline some of the behaviors that shape can be used to
analyze. First, is analysis of spamming botnets by template and/or campaign
detection based on shape. By identifying similar shapes from different parts of
the globe, one could surmise that they come from a matching bot host controller.
(A bot is a compromised host that resides on the internet, usually without the
host’s controller’s knowledge. The term bot has negative connotation and is
usually associated with malicious behavior such as spamming, denial of service,
or phishing. A botnet is a collection of two or more bots, and sometimes on the
order of 10,000.) Second, spam filtering has become second nature to world. It
has over 99% accuracy, but what of the last less than one percent? What were
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Fig. 1. Email shape analyzer.
the content and context that were able to escape the filtering process? In this
application we propose that e-shape analysis can be used to get closer to the goal
of 100% spam classification. Third, e-shape analysis shows the discriminatory
power to identify individuals on a personal level. In this application we build
personal finger prints and turn our classifier over to the ham side of email.
3.1 Spam Botnet Detection
Spamming botnets are notoriously hard to pin point, often needing to use several
methods to achieve decent accuracy. Here we present another tool to use in the
assessment of botnet detection. For this case study we gathered a data set of
spam emails collected by Gmail’s spam filter over the period of one month,
during July 2008. The data set was over 1,100 emails in four different languages.
The majority language was English. This data set was hand labeled into buckets
based on content, size, and email type (e.g. Plain, HTML, Multipart). Each
bucket would then contain similar emails, for example one group would contain
emails sent that contained “Kings Watchmaker”.
Hand labeling To hand label thousands of emails we developed a program
to display emails for ease of labeling. The program allows for a user to view
a recorded history of previous labels, at any time refer to specific email for
comparison, and resume previous labeling sessions. Files are written to an object
text file, known as pickling, to preserve the email object format. The botnet
label is written as a header directly into the email. A graphical user interface is
included for the program.
After labeling several hundred of the emails, we started to see patterns
emerge. We found evidence to support that botnet spammer’s used templates
to bypass spam filters, and they would fill in the blanks with the links and info
they needed to get through (An example of the actual spam botnet template is
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Fig. 2. An example of four different e-shapes.
shown in Fig. 3). The spam emails are very diverse, also shown by the multiple
languages. The details of our data set is listed on Table 3.1.
Template Discussion In the United States over 650 million email accounts
are owned by four companies: Microsoft(MSN), Yahoo, Google and AOL [10].
Google comes in a distant third to MSN and Yahoo. They are very protective
of their users and to get solicited emails to them can be an expensive process.
We have evidence [11][12][13] to believe botnets are using specific templates to
beat out spam filters. Seen in Fig. 3, a spammer would simply need to fill in the
blanks and begin his campaign. The use of randomized or individually written
emails for the purpose of spamming is not feasible on any small, medium or
large scale campaign. It is of note to the authors that multiple botnets could be
using the same template and be classified together. A separate method will be
analyzed for distinguishing them in future work.
The total number of buckets from hand labeling was 52. For analysis we discarded
buckets that had less than 10-emails per. This yielded 11 buckets. The shape of
the testing email was derived using Alg. 1, then classified into different botnet
groups. The measure of difference in shapes between these groups was based on
Hellinger distance [14] since the e-shape is built with an estimated probability
density functions (pdf). By using an estimated pdf, we are able to smooth out
the shape from its rigid skeleton. It also normalizes the number of lines in the
email, for use of Hellinger distance. The normalization of length is what provides
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Fig. 3. An example of the actual spam botnet template.
a size independent way to calculate shape. Looking at the template in Fig. 3,
a host spammer could add another paragraph with more links and not still not
drastically change the normalized e-shape of itself.
Figure 4 shows two email shapes from a Chinese botnet. Figure 4(a) is larger
than Fig. 4(b) by 22 lines, a difference of 11.8%. The two shapes are considerably
similar and were mapped to the same bucket by the e-shape algorithm.
The signature of each botnet group was computed as the expected value
(mean) of the group. We used predefined threshold level at 0.08, which found
to be the optimal threshold for our study. Hellinger distance is widely used for
estimating a distance (difference) between two probability measures (e.g., pdf,
pmf). Hellinger distance between two probability measures A and B can be
computed as follows.
d2H(A,B) =
1
2
M∑
m=1
(
√
am −
√
bm)2, (4)
where A and B are M -tuple {a1, a2, a3, ..., aM} and {b1, b2, b3, ..., bM} respec-
tively, and satisfy am ≥ 0,
∑
m am = 1, bm ≥ 0, and
∑
m bm = 1. Hellinger
distance of 0 implies that A = B whereas disjoint A and B yields the maximum
distance of 1.
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Table 1. Details of dataset for botnet detection experiment.
Feature Count
Total Emails 1,144
Email’s Sizes of 1 to 100 lines 906
Email’s Sizes of 101 to 200 lines 131
Email’s Sizes of 201 to 300 lines 42
Email’s Sizes of 301 to 400 lines 25
Email’s Sizes of 401 to 500 lines 40
Emails in English 815
Emails in Chinese 270
Emails in Spanish 57
Emails in German 2
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(a) Shape 1, 186 lines
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(b) Shape 2, 164 lines
Fig. 4. Showing size independence of shapes from the same botnet.
The accuracy of this data set is found from computing the number of correctly
labeled emails in a bucket to the total number of emails in that bucket. A false
positive indicates an email that was placed in the bucket but did not belong. A
false negative would be the total number of emails, from hand labeling, that are
in the rest of the buckets which belong to that bucket.
Figure 5 shows a promising accumulative accuracy rate of almost 81%. This
number reflects the cumulative accuracy of all the buckets. While some buckets
have a low accuracy, several of the buckets have a very good accuracy up to and
including 100%, seen in Table 2. The evidence of a 100% accuracy bucket would
show a positive match on an email campaign template. Accuracies below 50%
are simply emails that are of similar shape. For example, bucket 6 is a mismatch
of several botnet’s from different languages and types of spam emails. Email
shape analysis is showing good results in botnet and campaign classification,
the purpose being to take context and specific content out of the classification
process.
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Fig. 5. A result of the botnet detection experiment based on 879 different size and
language emails.
Table 2. Accuracy rate of individual bucket.
Bucket Accuracy False Negative False Positive Total Emails
1 41.37% 14 48 81
2 74.07% 20 20 76
3 80.95% 20 11 59
4 100% 0 0 129
5 68.75% 0 28 90
6 45.83% 0 25 67
7 100% 0 0 78
8 93.10% 14 6 81
9 88.00% 22 17 140
10 100% 0 0 118
11 100% 0 0 70
4 Future Work and Preliminary Results
In our on going work to discover and explore the full potential of e-shape analysis,
we take a look at a couple of possible applications and also some preliminary
analysis and results on them. Below we discuss the use of e-shape on spam
filtering and on social context-based finger printing. In our finger print analysis
we look at the capability of e-shape to differentiate senders from each other.
4.1 Spam Filtering
In this application of e-shape, we discuss the behavior that e-shape analysis can
have on the spam filtering process. The Bayesian filter proves to be over 99%
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successful most all the time. However, to reach the goal of 100% further analysis
is required. The Bayesian filter uses content and context to classify emails. The
process could be enhanced using the method of shape analysis to “look at” if
an email is spam or ham, taking content and context completely out of the
equation. Surprise emails to the classifier that can’t be categorized or are unique
in manufacturing might make it through.
The data set used for this case study was the Trec 2007 corpus [15]. The Trec
corpora are widely used in spam testing. The 2007 corpus was over 74,000 emails.
However, for this study, only the first 7,500 emails were used for analysis. The
corpus was approximately 67% spam and 33% ham and has been hand labeled
by the Trec Team.
The method for comparison of spam versus ham was similar to that of botnet
detection case study. Here we again used an unsupervised learning algorithm to
classify data. We have developed a program that will take an email file in MBOX
format and calculate how many similar groups their are and classify in the same
way as section 3.1. A testing email was classified to ham or spam based on
the closest clustered group signature. The drawback of this process is that the
buckets will need to be labeled by ham or spam, which is independent of our
classifier. Once the bucket is known to be ham/spam future email’s which are
classified into the bucket will be labeled as such.
Preliminary results show an accumulative accuracy of about 70% for 7,500
emails. The accuracy is great considering that no content or context was even
referenced. The ability for shape analysis to act as a spam filter would be recom-
mended for use with emails that the Bayesian filter finds unsure about. Future
work in that regard would be to implement shape analysis inside the Bayesian
filter process.
4.2 Social Context-Based Finger Print Detection
This application is on using e-shape analysis to identify an individual’s personal
email finger print based on social context. We define personal fingerprint as the
shape that one typically uses to contact others with. When an individual writes
emails, it is believed that his shape will stay relatively the same, although length
may change, the way he/she writes will not. An example of this would be an
individual that creates a new line about every 40-50 characters versus a person
that creates no new lines at all. It is also believed that this method can be used
to reveal a user’s clique’s, as seen in [16]. A user will type differently to his/her
boss and work mates than he/she would to their close friends. In this case study
we follow the aggregate pattern of other users sending to a specific person.
For the data set, we used the top three different senders from one subject’s
inbox. The emails were collected over five months. Using e-shape analysis, we
were able to distinguish these three senders to this subject, from unaltered emails
(no thread deletion), with an accuracy of about 75% (see Fig. 6). The accuracy
is considered good. Further refinement and post processing will be looked into
in the future for better results. The current results now is using only the e-shape
analysis.
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Fig. 6. A result of the social context-based individual’s personal email finger print
experiment based on three different individual email senders to a subject with total of
about 250 emails.
Of the approximately 250 emails that are tested and of the three groups
selected was a bi-weekly newsletter from a sales web site. The emails that came
from this web site were classified with 100% accuracy and no false positives. The
other two senders were from real human conversations.
This method reveals a very powerful tool in categorizing incoming emails
when comparing non-human to human emails. Newsletters, advertisements, and
solicitations can be moved separately by themselves to be reviewed later by a
user, keeping priority emails displayed first.
5 Limitations of the Study
Currently the E-Shape analysis tool does not have a way to compliment its
decision process by removing email threads and conversations. This drawback is
reduced by the power of e-shape analysis, but it believed that we still yet have
many abilities to unlock in this regard.
The shape analysis is a very useful tool to complement other tools as it can
provide the deciding factor to many close decisions. Such is the example in spam
detection where the content classifier can already achieve such a high accuracy.
Some emails are short by nature, the ability for shape analysis to distinguish
between others becomes limited. In the case of spam, short emails are common
and the limitation impact of e-shape analysis will be mitigated to a large extent.
As mentioned earlier, and with any tool, the less information you give it, the
less it can tell you. In the study of social context-based finger print detection, if
a subject has a subset of friends that like to send web hyperlinks back and forth,
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the classifier will be unable to distinguish between users. Study of group based
social awareness could be a possible application of this research.
Botnet detection is a challenging problem. There is not a singular solution
to this threat, and combining the latest innovations only brings us a step closer.
The purpose of E-Shape analysis for botnets is to bring the world one step closer.
E-shape analysis is a tool capable of template/campaign identification to find a
spamming bots before they are even able to send. Botnet identification is the
next logical step of the process and can be supported with this tool.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a novel concept of email shape (e-shape) and discuss
three case studies using a hidden discriminatory power of e-shape. By using e-
shape analysis we were able to detect botnet template/campaigns with about
81% accuracy. The botnet analysis can also be done with multiple languages
and email sizes, which shows that the e-shape analysis is language and size
independent. Next, we discuss the capabilities of e-shape in spam filtering. Since
e-shape is neither content nor context aware, it provides a unique point of view
when looking at spam emails. We used the TREC 2007 corpus to test the spam
filtering capabilities of e-shape. After running 7,500 emails through the email
shape detector, we had a success rate of about 70%. Lastly, we looked at social
context-based finger print detection, where we analyzed a single subject’s email
inbox. Using three different senders, we were able to achieve an accuracy rate of
over 70%.
It is important to note that while the accuracy’s of our system are not “high,”
the system of classification is taking content and context out of the classification
process. This provides a very useful tool to complement existing methods and
tools that currently handle emails, such as inching the Bayesian filter closer to
100% accuracy or assisting network behavior analyzers in determining botnet
relationships.
As we evolve our understanding of what e-shape analysis can offer, we plan
to improve the accuracies of the existing work and release more case studies.
Currently the shape analysis routine does not have any smart way of handling
email conversation threads or HTML code. This is the planned next direction of
our work and is believed to offer a significant increase to ham labeling accuracy.
Acknowledgment
This work is supported by the National Science Foundation under grants CNS-
0627754, CNS-0619871 and CNS-0551694.
References
1. A. Ramachandran and N. Feamster, “Understanding the network-level behavior of
spammers,” in SIGCOMM ’06: Proceedings of the 2006 conference on Applications,
12 P. Sroufe et al.
technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications. New York,
NY, USA: ACM, 2006, pp. 291–302.
2. W. T. Strayer, D. Lapsley, R. Walsh, and C. Livadas, “Botnet detection based on
network behavior,” in Botnet Detection: Countering the Largest Security Threat,
W. Lee, C. Wang, and D. Dagon, Eds. Springer-Verlag, 2007.
3. A. Ramachandran, N. Feamster, and D. Dagon, “Detecting botnet membership
with dnsbl counterintelligence.” in Botnet Detection, ser. Advances in Information
Security, W. Lee, C. Wang, and D. Dagon, Eds. Springer, 2008, vol. 36, pp.
131–142.
4. S. Sinclair, “Adapting bayesian statistical spam filters to the server side,” J. Com-
put. Small Coll., vol. 19, no. 5, pp. 344–346, 2004.
5. G. V. Cormack, “Email spam filtering: A systematic review,” Found. Trends Inf.
Retr., vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 335–455, 2007.
6. G. V. Cormack, J. M. Go´mez Hidalgo, and E. P. Sa´nz, “Spam filtering for short
messages,” in CIKM ’07: Proceedings of the sixteenth ACM conference on Confer-
ence on information and knowledge management. New York, NY, USA: ACM,
2007, pp. 313–320.
7. C.-P. Wei, H.-C. Chen, and T.-H. Cheng, “Effective spam filtering: A single-class
learning and ensemble approach,” Decis. Support Syst., vol. 45, no. 3, pp. 491–503,
2008.
8. E. Parzen, “On Estimation of a Probability Density Function and Mode,” The
Annals of Mathematical Statistics, vol. 33, no. 3, pp. 1065–1076, 1962.
9. S. J. Sheather and M. C. Jones, “A reliable data-based bandwidth selection method
for kernel density estimation,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B,
no. 53, pp. 683–690, 1991.
10. M. Brownlow, “Email and webmail statistics,” April 2008. [Online]. Available:
{http://www.email-marketing-reports.com/metrics/email-statistics.htm}
11. R. Paul, “Researchers track Ron Paul spam back to Reactor botnet,”
December 2007. [Online]. Available: {http://www.marshal8e6.com/trace/i/
Template-Based-Spam,trace.996∼.asp}
12. J. Stewart, “Top Spam Botnets Exposed,” April 2008. [Online]. Available: {http:
//www.secureworks.com/research/threats/topbotnets/?threat=topbotnets}
13. TRACElabs, “Template Based Spam,” May 2009. [Online]. Available: {http:
//www.marshal8e6.com/trace/i/Template-Based-Spam,trace.996∼.asp}
14. L. L. Cam and G. L. Yang, Asymptotics in Statistics: Some Basic Concepts.
Springer-Verlag, 2000.
15. G. V. Cormack and T. R. Lynam, “TREC 2007 Public Corpus,” 2007. [Online].
Available: {http://plg.uwaterloo.ca/∼gvcormac/treccorpus07/about.html}
16. S. J. Stolfo, S. Hershkop, C.-W. Hu, W.-J. Li, O. Nimeskern, and K. Wang,
“Behavior-based modeling and its application to email analysis,” ACM Trans. In-
ternet Technol., vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 187–221, 2006.
